Farmland Preservation Programs In West Virginia: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Merits of Purchase Development Rights by Stalebrink, Odd & Wilkinson, Samuel E
Regional Research Institute Publications and
Working Papers Regional Research Institute
2007
Farmland Preservation Programs In West Virginia:




Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/rri_pubs
Part of the Regional Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Regional Research Institute at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Regional Research Institute Publications and Working Papers by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @
WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Digital Commons Citation
Stalebrink, Odd and Wilkinson, Samuel E., "Farmland Preservation Programs In West Virginia: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Merits





FARMLAND PRESERVATION PROGRAMS IN WEST 
VIRGINIA: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE 
MERITS OF PURCHASE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
 
Odd J. Stalebrink (Corresponding)1 & Samuel E. Wilkinson2 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPER 2007-7 
 
Paper presented at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Southern Regional Science 
Association, Charleston, SC, March 29-31, 2007 
 
Abstract: To prevent the loss of farmland in West Virginia, the Voluntary Farmland 
Protection Act (VFPA) was passed in 2000. This act gives counties and the State 
authority to develop and fund local farmland protection programs, which typically 
involve a voluntary sale by a landowner of the right to develop the farmland. Following 
the purchase, the purchaser (often a government or a land trust) would retire the property. 
Since the inception of the VFPA, 5,000 acres of farmland have been retired in West 
Virginia. The objective of the paper is to assess the merit of this legislation in terms of its 
contribution toward its objective of preserving open space. The analysis is carried out at 
three levels, including the state, county and operational level. The state level analysis is 
conducted to assess the overall risk of eroding farmland in West Virginia. Aggregate 
statewide data will be used to determine this risk, including data on population density 
and state economic growth rates. A similar assessment is conducted at the county level to 
determine if development rights are more common in high growth counties (i.e., a micro 
level assessment). Finally, an analysis is conducted at the operational level to determine 
the operational efficiency the programs carried out under this legislation. The focus will 
be on the risk of misappropriation. Issues related to transparency and accountability in the 
distribution of funds swill be analyzed (how are decisions made, and how is 
accountability achieved).  It is concluded that there seem to be, at the minimum, 
significant inroads for critical examination of the VFPA.  
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FARMLAND PRESERVATION PROGRAMS IN WEST VIRGINIA: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE MERITS OF PURCHASE 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
 
Odd J. Stalebrink (Corresponding) & Samuel E. Wilkinson 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, activists opposing the consumption of farmland have worked to create 
policy that allows for protection of these open spaces. An increasingly popular way to 
achieve this is to rely on Purchase of Development Rights (PDR). These involve a 
voluntary sale by a landowner of the right to develop the farmland. Following the 
acquisition, the purchaser (either a government agency or a land trust) retires the property 
for purposes of preventing its development. While the existing use of development rights 
primarily is used for purposes of protecting farmland in regions that are experiencing 
rapid urban sprawl, similar programs are adopted in rural areas.  
This paper draws attention to policy allowing for the purchase of development 
rights in West Virginia. In efforts to prevent the loss of farmland in West Virginia, the 
state’s legislature passed legislation in 2000 giving counties and the State authority to 
develop and fund local farmland protection programs. The objective of this paper is to 
assess the merit of this legislation in terms of its contribution toward its objective of 
preserving open space.  
The analysis is two-pronged. The first portion of the analysis is conducted for 
purposes of assessing the actual need for farmland protection in West Virginia, based 
upon the legislation’s stated goals. This analysis is carried out both at the state and the 
county level. At the state level, the analysis is conducted for purposes of assessing the 
overall risk of eroding farmland in West Virginia. Aggregate statewide data is used to 
determine this risk, including data on population density and state economic growth rates. 
A similar assessment is conducted at the county level to determine if development rights 
are more common in high growth counties.  
 The second portion of the analysis is carried out at the operational level for 
purposes of offering insight to the operational efficiency of the programs carried out 
under this legislation. The focus will be on the risk of misappropriation. Issues related to 
transparency and accountability in the distribution of funds are analyzed.    
The study is important for several reasons. Perhaps most important, it sheds light 
on the effectiveness of farmland protection policies in West Virginia as tool for managing 
growth and economic development. It is also important for purposes of understanding the 
extent to which these policies may infringe on the economic growth potential of West 
Virginia. In West Virginia (and in many states around the country), development rights 
are sold in perpetuity. If these become widespread, they may become an institutional 
obstacle to necessary economic growth. This would add to an already difficult business 
climate context.  West Virginia was ranked as number 50 in terms of economic freedom, 
in a recent study (Black 2006). 
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The paper is organized into four sections. The first section offers a general 
overview of purchase of development rights (PDR). The second describes the existing 
farmland protection policies in the State of West Virginia, including the Voluntary 
Farmland Protection Act (WV Code §8-24-72 through §8-24-84 (2000)) and the 
Conservation and Preservation Easements Act (WV Code §20-12-2 (1995)). The third 
describes several research examining urban sprawl and sprawl in West Virginia. The final 
section suggests a theoretical framework that can be used for purposes of framing the 
findings of the research.   
Purchase of Development Rights Programs  
Purchase of Development Rights Programs (hereon forward PDR) exists nationwide in 
communities of all shapes and sizes. In a typical PDR program, an entity, governmental 
or non-profit, purchases a landowner’s development rights. According to Blaine et al 
(1998), the sale of development rights should be considered akin to the sale of mineral 
rights. In other words, the property owner can still control all aspects of the land, except 
for the previously purchased development rights. This purchase lasts as long as agreed 
upon; most PDR programs purchase development rights in perpetuity. Hence, even if the 
landowner sells his property to a third party, the development rights belong to the 
organization that purchased them.  
PDR programs are used by entities in two ways: to conserve land (either to protect 
farming interests, or to protect habitat for endangered species), or to steer development 
toward other geographic areas. Conservationists have argued that PDR programs are 
good ways to encourage the preservation of land, because instead of using regulatory 
policy to mandate what can and cannot be done with land, the conserving agency pays the 
landowner for his or her inaction. Main et al (1999) argues that conservation via 
regulation does not sufficiently reward landowners, who will in turn foster anti-
conservation sentiments. They advocate PDR programs, although these scholars note that 
there are significant resource limitations to their implementation. 
PDR programs got their start as a way for farms to hold out against financially 
stronger economic interests. Blaine et al (2006) describe PDR programs as one of the 
tools available to preservationists. PDR programs are designed to protect farmers by 
allowing these landowners to continue their own economic activity on the land after the 
rights have been sold. As such, PDR programs serve as a type of subsidy. While subsidies 
typically are used to protect or promote economic growth, PDR programs do not affect 
the market of the good produced on the property. They merely serve as a second means 
of income for the property owner. 
Farmland Protection in West Virginia 
The Voluntary Farmland Protection Act (VFPA) 
The Voluntary Farmland Protection Act (VFPA) was passed by the West Virginia 
legislature in 2000 (WV Code §8-24-72 through §8-24-84 (2000)) and became effective 
on June 8, 2000. The act was one of the first steps taken in the state to protect farmland 
while not forcing farmers to make particular decisions (West Virginia Farmland 
Protection, 2006). The VFPA allowed for the creation of Farmland Preservation Boards 
(FPB) and Farmland Protection Programs (FPP) in each of the state’s 55 counties, as well 
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as a state West Virginia Agricultural Land Protection Authority. It should be noted that 
the creation of these boards required county interest; in other words, counties 
disinterested in the VFPA are not required to act upon it. The act also limited the 
authority of these bodies; explained the farmland protection methodology and the ways in 
which property would be protected; explained where the funding for such protection 
would come from; explained the potential use of protected property; and allowed for the 
Commissioner of Agriculture to promulgate rules.  
The Act’s stated purpose is the protection of West Virginia’s dwindling farmland. 
It states: “The legislature hereby finds and declares that agriculture is a unique ‘life 
support’ industry and that a need exists to assist those agricultural areas of the state which 
are experiencing the irreversible loss of agricultural land.” According to West Virginia 
Farmland Protection Website (West Virginia Farmland Protection, 2007), which is the 
main information outlet about the West Virginia Farmland Protection act, West 
Virginia’s 25 most productive agricultural counties lost more than 100,000 acres of 
farmland in less than 15 years (between 1982-1997). Meanwhile, over the course of 33 
years (1964-1997), the state lost more than 1.8 million acres of farmland and more than 
20,000 acres of orchard land (West Virginia Farmland Protection: Background, 2007). 
Further analysis is needed to determine the extent of this land that has been developed in 
a way that leads to a reduction in open space.  
The West Virginia Farmland Protection (accessed March 16, 2007) also describes 
the funding mechanism underlying these programs. According to their Website, the 
VFPA allows each county to slightly increase real-estate transfer tax rates, allowing 
increases of $1.10 per $500 of value. One of the attractive elements in the use of the real-
estate transfer tax is that it can hit multiple times during rampant development. For 
example, revenue would be raised during the sale of a farm to housing developers, and 
again during the sale of the newly built housing to purchasers. The money raised from 
this increased taxation would then be used to fund Purchase of Development Rights (also 
known as Transfer of Development Rights) programs at the county level.  
 According to the West Virginia Farmland Protection Website the VFPA (West 
Virginia Farmland Protection, 2007), the Act is justified based on seven benefits. These 
include:  
1. Sustaining the state’s farming community. 
2. Providing a source of agricultural production within the state. 
3. Controlling urban expansion. 
4. Curbing urban blight. 
5. Protecting agricultural land for open-space use. 
6. Enhancing tourism. 
7. Protecting worthwhile community values.  
Within the Act itself, there is no further explanation, in the form of either 
definitions or benchmarks, of these seven reasons.  
The Conservation and Preservation Easements Act (CPEA)  
The Voluntary Farmland Protection Act (VFPA) was preceded by the Conservation and 
Preservation Easements Act (CPEA). Passed in 1996, the CPEA (WV Code §20-12-2 
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(1995)) facilitated the FVPA in 2000. The CPEA was designed accomplished two things 
(West Virginia Farmland Protection, 2007): it established the need to protect various 
types of locations through West Virginia, and it explained the way in which that 
protection might occur. The legislation laid dormant until 2000, when the VFPA was 
written, and passed, into law.  
The VFPA’s primary author is Lavonne Paden, who at the time served under the 
title of Farmland Protection Specialist at the Canaan Valley Institute (CVI), which, 
according to its official website describes itself as “…a nonprofit, non-advocacy 
organization that helps organizations identify, solve, and implement solutions to serious 
water issues impacting their daily lives (www.canaanvi.org).” Ms. Paden currently serves 
as the Executive Director of the Berkley County Farmland Protection Board (see, 
www.wvfarmlandprotection.org). Other key figures in the development of the VFPA was 
Pat Bowen, the NRCS’s Assistant State Conservationist for Field Operations, and Senator 
John Unger, one of two representatives from Berkley and Jefferson Counties in West 
Virginia’s eastern panhandle (Bowen, 2007; Paden, 2007). 
In a semi-structured interview, Ms. Paden explained that the CVI got involved in 
farmland protection because it believed that protected farmland would have a positive 
benefit on its own projects (Paden, 2007). In this interview, Ms. Paden also explained that 
farmland protection policies in Maryland and Pennsylvania served as an inspiration for a 
similar program in West Virginia. The major difference between these and the final 
policy that was adopted in WV was, according to Paden, that parts of the law had to be 
changed to account for West Virginia’s topography. Both Pennsylvania and Maryland 
feature significant portions of flat farmland, while almost all of West Virginia’s farmland 
exists on the sides of hills and mountains.    
In 2002, the state took one final, and important, step in the evolution of 
development right purchasing. The VFPA was amended to allow counties to collect their 
own funding for farmland preservation via the previously discussed real-estate transfer 
tax (West Virginia Farmland Protection, 2007). This meant that, besides the federal 
monies that were available to counties with established boards, there could also be 
income generated locally that was immediately earmarked for development right 
purchasing.  
According to Paden, the VFPA moved through the state legislature with relatively 
limited friction. It encountered some resistance from the state’s Department of Highways 
and from education supporters. The Department of Highways worried that properties 
whose development rights had been purchased could not be repossessed by the state 
through eminent domain.  There was also some concern raised among education 
supporters, who worried that the established tax-base for farmland development would 
encroach on the tax-base for schooling.   
An important factor in moving the legislation, according to Paden, was the 
prospect of having Federal Funds as the means of financing the program. Given, federal 
funding the West Virginia’s government would be required to provide no initial financial 
outlay to get local boards started. The connection for the federal money was Pat Bowen 
who had at his disposal federal funds from the US Department of Agriculture and 
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whatever would be raised in individual counties through newly increased property 
transfer taxes (Bowen, 2007).  
Current State of the Act  
According to West Virginia Farmland Protection (West Virginia Farmland 
Protection, 2007), 16 of West Virginia’s 55 counties currently have created the boards 
necessary to begin purchasing development rights, including Berkeley, Fayette, Grant, 
Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hardy, Jefferson, Lincoln, Mineral, Monroe, Morgan, Nicholas, 
Pendleton, Pocahontas, Preston and Summers. These counties represent an estimated (4) 
population of roughly 423,000, or a little more than 24 percent of the state’s total 
population.  
 
Two more counties, Monongalia and Putnam, have boards, but have not yet begun 
the process of collecting tax revenue for PDR purchases. Finally, there are ten counties 
beginning the process: Barbour, Braxton, Doddridge, Harrison, Lewis, Marion Randolph, 
Tucker, Upshur, and Wood.  All but Lincoln County are shown on the map above; 
Lincoln added its program in early.  
According to the NRCS, development rights for 6121 acres of farmland in West 
Virginia have been purchased from 44 different sellers. The development rights cost a 
total $17,359,712. The federal government funded $6,978,277 of that; West Virginia 
counties, via the real-estate transfer tax, funded the remaining $10,381,435.  The average 
cost per acre was $2836. The counties that have protected the most farmland include, in 
order, Berkeley, Jefferson and Morgan, which possess 3581 acres of the total. Two of 
those three counties are represented by John Unger, one of the original authors of the 
legislation, while the third borders Unger’s legislative territory. The cost of this acreage 
was $12,254,922.  
Research Approach 
The stated research objective of the paper is to assess the merit of this legislation in terms 
of its contribution toward its objective of preserving open space. As noted in the 
introduction, the analysis is two-pronged. It includes analysis of the actual need for 
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farmland protection based upon the legislation’s stated goals, and an analysis of the 
operational efficiency of the programs carried out under this legislation. 
Several data sources were used for purposes of the analysis, including 2000 US 
census data, and 2005 US census estimates of population change within West Virginia. In 
addition to these data sources, semi-formal interview were held with two of the above 
mentioned key persons involved in the preparation of the legislation – Mr. Pat Bowen 
and Ms. Lavonne Paden. The principal purpose of the interviews was to collect 
information about the prospective operational efficiency of the PDR programs in WV. 
Particular emphasis was placed on collecting information about the effectiveness of the 
allocation process of funds, in terms of rigor and the transparency and accountability 
associated with these allocations.  
Needs-Based Analysis  
The purpose of this portion of the analysis is to assess the overall risk of eroding 
farmland in West Virginia at the county level as well as at the state as a whole.  Through 
the VFPA, the threat of sprawl is both implicit and explicit. Thus, a natural starting point 
for this analysis is to determine the risk of sprawl for the state as a whole and at the 
county level.  
There are numerous ways to measure sprawl. Smart Growth for America, an anti-
sprawl advocacy group, identifies four different approaches (Galster, et al. 2000). The 
first, and simplest, is a measure developed by USA Today, for a series of articles the 
newspaper ran about sprawl in the United States (Nasser & Overberg, 2001). Published in 
2001, USA Today took each of America’s then 271 metropolitan areas and rank ordered 
them based upon the amount of the metropolitan area’s population that was urbanized 
(defined as a population of greater than 1000 residents per square-mile). The 271 
metropolitan areas were rank ordered again based upon the amount of change between 
1990 and 1999. Those two numbers were combined and then rank ordered a final time, 
creating a list of the most sprawling metropolitan areas in America. Metropolitan areas 
are defined by the US Census Bureau as a place with, “a core urban are of 50,000 or more 
population…as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and 
economic integration with that urban core.” (US Census, 2005) 
A second measure of sprawl was developed by the Sierra Club (SC). The SC’s 
measures were based on an account of several factors including “population shifts from 
city to suburb, growth of land area vs. growth of population, time wasted in traffic, and 
loss of open space.” (Nasser & Overberg, 2001). 
A third measure was developed by George Galster, an academician, as part of his 
examination of America’s thirteen largest metropolitan areas (Ewing, et al, 2005). Galster 
compared these metropolitan areas on eight different levels, including density, continuity, 
concentration, clustering, centrality, nuclearity, mixed use and proximity.  
A final measure has been developed by Smart Growth America (SGA). It 
measures 83 metropolitan areas (Karabegovic & McMahon, 2006) including every 
metropolitan with a population greater than 500,000. SGA computes sprawl based upon 
four factors: residential density, neighborhood diversity of jobs and housing, strength of 
downtowns/activities, and accessibility of street network.  
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Regardless of the definition used, West Virginia would score low on sprawl. An 
analysis of state and county data provide several strong indicators of the limited presence 
of sprawl in West Virginia. First, of the sixteen counties with currently operating VFPA 
boards, eight have no connection to any metropolitan area at all, including Grant, 
Greenbrier, Hardy, Monroe, Nicholas, Pendleton, Pocahontas, and Summers County. The 
other eight counties (Berkeley, Fayette, Hampshire, Jefferson, Lincoln, Mineral, Morgan, 
and Preston) have connections to either metropolitan or micropolitan areas; micropolitan 
areas are defined by the US Census Bureau as a place with a core urban area of 10,000 or 
more residents but less than 50,000 (US Census, 2005). Hence, eight of the counties that 
are currently protecting farmland from sprawl have no urban areas, or any connection to 
urban areas.  
The other eight counties are geographically connected to urban areas, including 
Berkeley and Morgan (Hagerstown, MD, and Martinsburg, WV), Fayette (Oak Hill, 
WV), Hampshire (Winchester, VA), Jefferson (Washington, DC, and 
Arlington/Alexandria, VA), Lincoln (Charleston, WV), Mineral (Cumberland, MD), and 
Preston (Morgantown, WV).  
Second, none of the West Virginia counties with populations dense enough to be 
considered urban areas currently have any sort of farmland protection program in place. 
The highest population density is found in Berkeley County, which has 236.5 persons per 
square mile, putting it more than 750 short of urban area status (US Census, 2000). This 
is worth remembering, especially when considering that all measures of urban sprawl 
start with examinations of metropolitan areas.   
Finally, urban sprawl assumes a certain level of economic development. At an 
aggregate level, it seems reasonable enough to assume that places that are experiencing 
slow or stagnant economic growth rates are not subject to sprawl. Numerous studies 
suggest that West Virginia struggles to grow economically. 
According a report issued by the Center for Economic Development in 2006, 
West Virginia received “F” grades, the lowest grades possible in multiple categories, 
including economic performance, business vitality and development capacity (Terry, 
2007). WV score ranks low with on business climate measures. Forbes Magazine rated 
West Virginia amongst the three worst states in the nation in which to do business 
(Badenhausen, 2006). The state was joined by Louisiana and Mississippi, both a year 
removed from the devastating after-effects of Hurricane Katrina. According to 
Badenhausen (5), West Virginia suffers greatly because of its poor labor pool, its weak 
prospects for growth, and a low quality-of-life ranking. Several scholars are also pointing 
at the low level of economic freedom in West Virginia, when describing the business 
climate (20). West Virginia ranks 45 according to the Frazer Institute’s Economic 
Freedom Index (Karabegovic & McMahon, 2006). In another economic freedom study, 
West Virginia was ranked as number 50 (Black 2006). 
Based on measures of sprawl, thus, the VFPA appears to be directed at solving a 
problem that does not exist, at least according to the legislation’s justification. That is, 
there seems to be only a minimal threat of urban sprawl, the actual threat of rampant 
development (or over-development) seems limited. If the threat is limited, then the 
legislation’s justification is weakened.  
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Operational Level Analysis  
In addition to these indicators, the interviews held with Pat Bowen and Lavonne 
Paden offered several insights regarding the operational efficiency of the programs. First, 
they indicated that one of the driving forces behind the adoption of the VFPA was 
available federal dollars. This money, available through Natural Resource Conservation 
Service (NRCS), was unavailable without county boards and the accompanying increase 
in taxation. Although the NRCS is allowed to match funds provided by counties, it cannot 
purchase development rights itself. 
Second, the interviews explained the central role played by the CVI. The CVI, 
based in Thomas, West Virginia, is an organization interested in watershed protection. 
According to Paden (Paden, 2007), the CVI had several motivations for supporting the 
creation of farmland protection legislation, including the prospect of using it to achieve 
its own objective of watershed protection. Zoning was considered as a first solution, 
although Bowen & Paden (Bowen, 2007; Paden 2007) believed it would receive little 
support from state politicians who were thought to view zoning as inhibiting localized 
economic development. Development right purchasing was thought to be far more 
politically palatable, because individuals were free to sell, or not sell, their development 
rights.  
Third, according to both Bowen and Paden, the VFPA offers no specific means 
for measuring the program’s effectiveness and, as explained above, the legislation itself 
contains no benchmarks. This is highly problematic not only from an accountability and 
transparency perspective, but also for purposes of improving these programs. Without the 
necessary definitions and benchmarks, it is difficult to assess whether the 6121 acres of 
farmland that have been preserved in West Virginia ought to be protected and the trade-
offs associated with the preserving it. 
Fourth, outside of restrictions designed to prevent development right purchasing 
in places without county boards, there are no guidelines about where the money is 
supposed to be spent. Bowen (Bowen 2007) explained that he tries to spend his allotment 
of money in as many places as possible for purposes of making sure that federal money 
goes to every county with a board. Furthermore, there is no cap on spending.  The merit 
of this distribution criterion may be questioned, given that the above broadly stated 
program objective. For example, development rights in places under the most threat will 
cost the most (as the land’s value is at a premium); however, the result of those premium 
prices is that it becomes a very expensive proposition to save vast swathes of land. 
Meanwhile, in places where the land’s value is the lowest specifically because of a lack 
of demand, saving acreage becomes far less expensive. This distribution of funds may be 
inconsistent the general program objective.  That is, if the need to protect land is based 
upon the threat of sprawl, should these programs be targeting spending toward places 
where he can save the most threatened land, or places where he can save the most land? 
Obviously, there are no easy answers to such questions, but the legislation itself provides 
no arrows pointing in one or the other direction. 
Finally, the definitions of what constitute farmland are made at the discretion of 
the local board (O’Donoghue, 2007). According to Bowen, there is no investigation of a 
landowner’s intent when deciding whether or not to purchase his or her development 
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rights. In other words, the farmer who has every intention of staying put and never selling 
his or her land to anybody can still qualify to have the farm’s development rights 
purchased. In addition, the definition of what constitute farmland is made at the 
discretion of the local board (O’Donoghue, 2007).  
Moving Beyond the Policy Justification  
The above analysis raises several concerns with regards to farmland protection policies in 
West Virginia. First, the state and county wide analysis raises concerns about the broadly 
stated policy justification for farmland protection policies in West Virginia. Again, it is 
justified on the basis of the risk of urban sprawl. The analysis, however, indicate that 
there seems to be only a minimal threat of urban sprawl among the counties that are 
planning for or have already implemented farmland protection policies. As such, the 
legislation’s justification is weakened. Given this, it is seems reasonable to conclude the 
adoption and expansion of these programs is driven by motivations that go beyond the 
principal justification for these programs. 
One such possibility is that the policies are being adopted for purposes of 
protecting existing property owners from being “priced out,” as a result of increases in 
property values and accompanying increases in tax burden.  This concern has been raised 
in several states, Montana in particular (Robbins, 2006), where there has been a 
substantial growth in second homes. A similar argument may also be made in West 
Virginia, where a select number of counties are experiencing substantial property value 
increases as a result of this. Pocahontas, Morgan, Berkley and Greenbrier County are 
good examples of this.  
Another possibility is that they are being adopted for based on rent-seeking 
motives. The broadly stated objectives of the VFPA make it difficult to assure 
accountability and transparency of these programs. The limited transparency increases 
the risk for of rent-seeking behavior in these programs. Such behavior may potential 
undermine the benefits provided by the programs. Some controversy has already been 
raised in this regard (See, Snyder, 2006).  
Another aspect that needs to be addressed regards the trade-offs associated with 
these programs in terms of economic growth. Permanent retirement of land via the selling 
of development rights to government agencies would trigger concern from economists 
like Kirzner, who take a critical stance toward the ability of government actors to manage 
markets. Israel Kirzner has made a point of observing that government regulation is often 
created with only the best of intentions: to fix prices that are too low or too high or to 
allow or disallow competition. He argued (Kirzner, 1982) that the greatest effect of 
government regulation may, in fact, never be known, because what is impeded via the 
regulation is entrepreneurial discovery.   
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has attempted to offer insight to the West Virginia Voluntary Farmland 
Protection Act, both by describing its creation, explaining its operation, and exploring 
potential criticism. The most important finding of the paper is that there seems to be only 
a minimal threat of urban sprawl among the counties that are planning for or have already 
implemented farmland protection policies. As such, the legislation’s justification is 
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weakened. Given this, it is seems reasonable to conclude the adoption and expansion of 
these programs in West Virginia are driven by motivations other than those that are stated 
in the policy (i.e., preservation of open space, due to urban sprawl). The VFPA appears to 
be directed at solving a problem that does not exist.  
One possibility is that they are adopted for purposes of protecting existing 
property owners from being “priced out,” as a result of increases in property values and 
accompanying increases in tax burden.  This concern has been raised in several states, 
Montana in particular (Robbins, 2006). Another possibility that ought to be explored is 
the role of rent-seeking behavior in these programs given the limited level of 
transparency that accompanies West Virginia’s programs and some of the controversy 
that have been associated with them (Snyder, 2006). To further the understanding of the 
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